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Abstract—Devices equipped with accelerometer sensors such
as today’s mobile devices can make use of motion to exchange
information. A typical example for shared motion is shaking of
two devices which are held together in one hand. Deriving a
shared secret (key) from shared motion, e.g. for device pairing,
is an obvious application for this. Only the keys need to be
exchanged between the peers and neither the motion data nor
the features extracted from it. This makes the pairing fast and
easy. For this, each device generates an information signal (key)
independently of each other and, in order to pair, they should be
identical. The key is essentially derived by quantizing certain
well discriminative features extracted from the accelerometer
data after an implicit synchronization. In this paper, we aim
at finding a small set of effective features which enable a
significantly simpler quantization procedure than the prior art.
Our tentative results with authentic accelerometer data show that
this is possible with a competent accuracy (76%) and key strength
(entropy approximately 15 bits).
Keywords—accelerometer, feature extraction, quantization, in-
formation signal
I. INTRODUCTION
In mobile computing world, the notion of device pairing
holds a great potential for short-term interactions, for example
file transfer and payment, and long-term interactions such as
device pairing with an accessory. The most common approach
to address device pairing issue is typing a PIN code or
password into the involved devices [1]. However, this approach
is impractical and as a result brings an overhead when there
are many short-lived pairings.
Device pairing by shaking is a recent approach. It is
a movement limited data channel between the two devices
[2],[3]. Shaking process consists of fast up and down move-
ments in the 3D space [4]. It is known that two devices that
are shaken together will experience similar but not exactly the
same movement patterns [5]. This is a consequence of both
imprecise accelerometer sensor embedded in the devices and
different coordinate spaces of accelerometers during shaking
process. In this work, this shared motion is exploited in
that the recorded accelerometer signals are used to generate
information signals independently of each other on both de-
vices by feature extraction followed by a simple quantization
procedure. Ideally, both information signals are expected to
become identical. The proposed approach is shown in Figure 1.
In the proposed approach, any kind of communication
between devices such as exchange of acceleration signal char-
acteristics is not allowed until the confirmation process is ac-
Fig. 1: The proposed approach
complished. This means, for example, that the choice of using
correlation of two signals was discarded. The ultimate goal
is to generate an information signal from each accelerometer
signal separately such that both information signals become
identical for the same (shared) shaking processes. Moreover,
both information signals should be different for different shak-
ing processes. As a result of this, the problem of verification
of whether the two devices are shaken together or not turns
into a 2-class classification problem. For this particular aim,
we first extract a few well-discriminative features such as
kurtosis, crest factor, peak to peak, average power, etc. and
then simply pass the feature signals to the standard decimal-
to-binary quantizer equipped with a harsh rounding to obtain
a binary key of a desired length (key strength).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, the
related work is presented. The signal processing methodology
is introduced in Section III. In Section IV, the experimental
setup and results are presented and in Section V we conclude
our work and discuss topics for future research.
II. RELATED WORK
Device pairing by shaking was first presented in “Smart-
Its Friends” [6]. The drawback of this technique was lacking
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of authentication of the involved devices in the interaction.
Another closely related work included accelerometer based
analysis to determine whether the devices are carried by the
same person or not [7]. The feature extraction algorithms
used in [5] includes coherence measure, which was originally
introduced in [7], and quantized FFT coefficients. In [4],
a similar approach in which acceleration signal was used
for key generation was presented with a difference in using
time domain acceleration features contrary to [5] where only
frequency domain features were used. They claim that the
same key would rather likely be generated for different shaking
processes if the key generation was based on a frequency-based
technique. They concluded that the frequency domain is not
suitable for key generation.
Our work shows a similar approach proposed in [4] and [5]
which are, to our knowledge, the only two relevant articles1.
The similarities between our work and [4], [5] lay on space
dimension reduction using Euclidean norm, and both [4] as
well as Protocol 2 in [5] prohibit exchange of acceleration data.
However, in [4] the signal is divided into segments from which
a few principal components are extracted and used to learn the
representation vectors. The key generation algorithm in [4] is
based on pair wise nearest neighbour quantization. In contrast,
we pick a few features with high discrimination power. Thus,
it is possible to use a computationally cheaper quantization
method, namely standard decimal-to-binary quantization. In
[5], two alternative protocols are proposed. Protocol 1 requires
exchange of acceleration data which we prohibit. Protocol 2
determines multiple candidate feature vectors where one device
transmits all candidate feature vectors to the other device.
Authentication is performed by thresholding the percentage
of matching candidate feature vectors. Contrary to [5], we
transmit only one information signal to each device which
prevents the communication overhead. Another difference is
that in [5] a protocol is implicitly triggered whereas we use
explicit triggering by bumping both devices at the same time.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Pre-processing of accelerometer signals
The first task is to acquire acceleration data properly
from the accelerometer sensor. Since both mobile phones are
unsynchronized initially, they need a user interaction for syn-
chronizing the starting points of recording the shaking process
(temporal alignment). This task can be realized through a direct
user input such as pressing a “start synchronization” button.
However, this method is not user-friendly. In this work, in
order to make accelerometer sensors start data recording at
the same time, two mobile phones are tapped simultaneously at
one’s hand. This tapping (or bump) leads to a significantly high
amplitude in acceleration signal since the two mobile phones
were shaken and then are suddenly blocked. The acceleration
signal values are compared to a pre-defined threshold value and
when the bump occurs they both exceed the threshold value.
Accordingly, it starts recording data. Alternatively, the user
can initially start shaking with a fast movement so that two
devices are subjected to a high acceleration. This also behaves
as a bump and enables the synchronization. If the bump is
1There exist several publications by the same authors based on practically
the same ideas.
detected by two devices, it is guaranteed that the two devices
are synchronized within a few samples.
An accelerometer signal value2 at a fixed time point is
typically 3-dimensional, say (sx, sy, sz). Since the spatial
alignment between devices is unknown, the 3 dimensions
recorded by the two devices will not be aligned [5]. In
this work, Euclidean norm is thought to be convenient to
circumvent this problem because shaking processes often take
place approximately on only one fixed axis and hence e.g. the
Euclidean norm enables us to see shaking processes as 1D
oscillations (Figure 2) [4], [5]. From now on, we call these
1D signals as raw acceleration signals, say s, whose elements
s =
√
sx2 + sy2 + sz2 correspond to one time point each.
Now, for example, the measured shared motion training data
is the set D1 = {(s1i (m), s2i (m))}, where the index i refers to
a test subject who shakes the devices 1 and 2 simultaneously
at one hand, s is the above defined raw acceleration signal,
and m refers to the mth shake. For example, s1i (m) is the raw
acceleration signal (time series) obtained from the mth shaking
process by the ith subject measured by the device 1.
Finally, the raw signals are filtered with a 1D box filter,
which is a lowpass FIR filter. The lowpass filter smooths the
noisy signal. If the kernel size is increased more, it starts to
extract the envelope of the signal (see Figure 2).
B. Feature extraction from accelerometer signals
The raw acceleration signals are typically high dimensional
with respect to the time dimension (i.e. each time series
contains a high number of elements) being impractical to
work with. Feature extraction is applied not only to reduce the
dimension but also to define an efficient collection of features
to discriminate between shared and different shaking processes
with a good accuracy. A feature signal is directly used to
generate a binary information signal.
In this work, 10 different features were used: number
of peaks, root-mean-square (rms), mean, variance, skewness,
kurtosis, crest factor, peak to peak, autocorrelation and average
power. These features are extracted from the whole accelera-
tion signal without doing any windowing. Since the ranges of
feature values are quite different, feature values are normalized
before the feature signal is passed to the quantizer.
C. Key generation
The ultimate objective is to generate exactly the same
key from shared shaking processes independently without
exchanging any acceleration signal content. Moreover, we want
our algorithm to generate different keys on devices when
they are not shaken together. Mathematically speaking, for
positive (shared motion) class test data D1 we would like
to have Q(F(s1i (m)), nb) = Q(F(s2i (m)), nb) where Q(.)
denotes the quantizer, F(.) denotes the feature extractor and
nb denotes the number of bits. On the other hand, for negative
(different motion) class test data, say D2, we would like to
have Q(F(ski (m)), nb) 6= Q(F(slj(n)), nb) (D1 and D2 are
mutually exclusive). The main assumption in key generation
is that cross correlation between signals from the same shared
2After excluding the effect of gravity g (acquired through lin-
ear acceleration sensor in Android API).
motion is high enough to independently generate exactly the
same key. Similarly, the cross correlation of signals from
different shared motion is assumed to be small not to generate
the same key. This would make it possible to define F(.) and
Q(.) as given above such that the positive and negative classes
can be separated with a sufficiently high accuracy and key
strength.
It is known that although the both signals are similar,
they are not identical due to the reasons we discussed in
Section I. For example, Figure 2 shows a similar but not
identical signal pair. As a consequence, similar raw signals
result in similar feature signals. However, we want our key
generation algorithm to map similar feature signals to exactly
same key which requires a hashing process. This could be
realized via a quantizer which can also be interpreted as a
classifier.
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Fig. 2: Raw vs. filtered signals for device 1 and device 2
Before the normalized feature signal is passed to Q(.), it
is rescaled according to number of bits used in the binary
representation of the key. The canonical conversion from
decimal to binary is adopted for mapping. At the end of
quantization and binary representation, a bit stream of a certain
length will be generated based on the number of features and
number of bits used in binary representation.
The main task is to define F(.) and Q(.) using the test
data D1 and D2 such that the classification accuracy between
positive and negative classes is sufficiently high and, at the
same time, a sufficiently strong key is possible to generate.
This will be considered in detail in Section IV. After defining
F(.) and Q(.) the method is ready to be used for new
shaking processes. When the two devices are shaken, each of
them applies F(.) and Q(.) to their own acceleration signal
respectively. It is important to notice that this procedure is
autonomous which means that each device performs these
computations locally without any knowledge about its peer. In
the verification phase, device 1 transmits its information signal
(bitstream) to device 2 and compares the received information
signal with the result of its own and vice versa. If they are
equal (either in strict sense or relaxed sense; c.f. Section IV),
the devices are paired. Otherwise, they are not paired which
can be thought of as ”access denied”.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
In this work, two Samsung Galaxy Nexus smart-phones
are used to acquire accelerometer sensor data. The data are
acquired from linear acceleration sensor, which is a software-
based sensor, of Android API. The sampling rate Fs of the
sensor is 100Hz. The off-line signal processing is performed
using Matlab R2014a.
The positive class test data D1 consists of 150 shaking
experiments recorded from 10 individuals (i = 1, . . . , 10;
m = 1, . . . , 15) . Five of the test subjects are male and five
of them are female. All test subjects are asked to shake two
devices (1 and 2) together in one hand for five seconds which
results in approximately 500 time samples in an acceleration
signal. Except this, no other instructions are given to the
individuals. Negative class test data D2 is generated randomly
from the positive class test data (i.e. by forming randomly pairs
of ski (m) such that the pairs do not belong to D1). The number
of pairs of acceleration signals in D1 is 10 × 15 = 150. For
D2, in turn, 300 test samples are randomly generated from
D1 such that first two random individuals are selected out
of 10 individuals and then two acceleration signals of those
two individuals are randomly selected. This pair of signals
constitutes one negative test sample of D2.
To define F(.) we use the 10 features listed in Section
III-B. We have chosen them manually in this work. The
standard decimal-to-binary quantizer is applied to each of the
10 feature signals with the number nb bits. The resulting 10
bitstreams are then concatenated resulting in keys of 10× nb
bits. This procedure forms the quantizer Q(.) in this article.
It is worth to notice that this quantization method is very
simple to implement and calculate. Now, we have to assess
whether we can achieve a sufficiently good performance and
keys strong enough with these definitions of F(.) and Q(.).
For performance assessment, confusion matrices3 as well
as accuracy4 and F15 measure are presented for both strict
and relaxed cases (Table I, II, III). In the strict case, both
information signals must agree on every bit to be considered
a positive class whereas in the relaxed case, both bit strings
must agree on at least 90% of all bits. For example, for a bit
string of length 40, at least 36 bits are required to be same.
Note that if both bit strings are close but not exactly the same,
e.g. as in our case the Hamming distance is small, they can
still be used to establish a secure encryption scheme based on
a so-called fuzzy extractor [8].
The results presented in Table III are obtained using the
best values of nb (refers to the number of bits in binary
representation) and ks (refers to the low pass filter size used
in preprocessing stage). The best parameters of nb and ks in
terms of maximizing accuracy and F1 are determined with an
exhaustive grid search for both strict and relaxed case. Figure
3 shows parameter space for filtered signals.
The confusion matrices as well as accuracy and F1
measures show that relaxing the key confirmation criteria
obviously increases the performance. Lowpass filtering the raw
acceleration signals has a positive effect on the results. The
3Let C be 2×2 confusion matrix. According to matlab indexing C(1,1) is
true positive (TP), C(1,2) is false negative (FN), C(2,1) is false positive (FP),
C(2,2) is true negative (TN)
4Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
5F1 =
2TP
2TP + FP + FN
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Fig. 3: Parameter space for filtered signals
TABLE I: Performance measure and best parameters in strict
case (Acc=Accuracy, nb=number of bits, ks=kernel size)
Acc nb ks F1 nb ks
RAW 0.76 4 - 0.46 4 -
FILT. 0.79 4 25 0.59 4 50
best accuracy and F1 results are gained with filtered signals
in relaxed case using 4 bits and a kernel size of 5. As expected,
the percentage of false negatives is higher than false positives.
For the above four cases (strict/relaxed, raw/filtered) we
also estimated the entropies of the information signals. The
maximal possible entropy is of course 40 bits when each
of the 10 feature signals are quantized to nb = 4 four bits
and then concatenated to one bitstream of length 40. The
needed probabilities were obtained by estimating a multivariate
Bernoulli mixture with the expectation maximization algorithm
from our keys [9]. The Bayesian information criterion was
used to determine the size of the mixture [10]. The hereby
calculated entropies varied between 14-16 bits for the four
cases, which is sufficiently strong security for typical device
pairing applications.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have presented a recent idea of generating
cryptographic key from the shared shaking movement using
two smart phones. The generated key is going to be used for
pairing of mobile phones which enables a secure connection
between devices. The main idea in this work is that two devices
shaken together in one hand experiences similar acceleration
signals which can be utilized to generate a cryptographic
key locally without any communication between devices until
confirmation phase.
In this paper, first we address the problem of synchroniza-
tion in an efficient way. Then, we demonstrated that by utiliz-
ing only a few (10) informative features a strong 40-bit key
could be generated. The average entropy was approximately
15 bits per key which is slightly higher than the entropy of
the Bluetooth PIN (10-13 bits). Off-line experiments showed
that 76% of same shaking processes generate the same key
with pre-processing and relaxing the key confirmation criteria.
On the other hand, only 4% of different shaking processes
generated the same key.
TABLE II: Performance measure and best parameters in re-
laxed case (Acc=Accuracy, nb=number of bits, ks=kernel size)
Acc nb ks F1 nb ks
RAW 0.84 4 - 0.73 4 -
FILT. 0.89 4 5 0.82 4 5
TABLE III: Confusion matrices for all cases
STRICT RELAXED
Accuracy F1 Accuracy F1
RAW 46 104 46 104 99 51 99 510 300 0 300 21 279 21 279
FILT. 64 86 68 82 114 36 114 366 294 11 289 13 287 13 287
We conclude that our results (76%, 4%) are promising and
sufficiently accurate for our purposes. The proposed method
allows generation of strong keys with a significantly simpler
quantization method than in [4]. The features were chosen here
manually, but we are certain that it is possible to develop a
sophisticated and objective feature extractor which can define
the most optimal features based on a given training data
in order to satisfy pre-defined accuracy and key strength
requirements. This will be the topic of our future research.
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